Paper in progress
Many liberal democracies are sanctioning Russia in response to its ongoing invasion of Ukraine, through restrictions on goods and financial services that support Russia’s military activities. As the war continues into its third year, Russia has increased trade flows with China and other autocratic states. Critics argue that sanctions have ‘failed,’ both in the sense of not altering President Putin’s decision-making and in not blocking Russia’s access to the material means to pursue its war. Supporters contest these empirical claims and also appeal to the symbolic value of sanctions: the sanctions communicate condemnation to Russia and other potential aggressors. I believe these evaluative standards set the bar for success too high, given the dispersion of economic power and extent of ethical disagreement in current global conditions. It is often infeasible for a society’s sanctions, or a consumer group’s boycott, to have ‘leverage’ over other economic actors or to communicate in ways that others will understand. This is not to say that decisions to sanction or boycott are/should be solipsistic or judged merely by the subjective standards of the decision-maker. Rather, this paper defends a potential value in sanctions and boycotts as a meaningful expression. Sanctions can be a meaningful expression about a liberal democracy’s aims and values, which it had pursued in cooperation with another state—which, in turn, was materially enabled in pursuit of its own aims. I consider doubts about whether liberal democracies are currently in a good position to act meaningfully in imposing sanctions, given the broader context of their trade policies. Finally, this paper raises and addresses objections about the weight of this value in comparison to other considerations.