

London School of Economics & Political Science  
Department of Government  
2021-2022

GV4D7: Dilemmas of Equality  
Michaelmas Term 2021

- Course instructor: Dr Sarah Goff ([s.goff@lse.ac.uk](mailto:s.goff@lse.ac.uk))  
Office hours: Fridays, 15.00-17.00 in Centre Building 3.08  
Please book an appointment using Student Hub or email to make other arrangements
- Lecture: All lectures will be recorded and made available on the course's online Moodle page. The recordings will be available for students to view at their convenience, prior to the weekly seminars.
- Seminars: There are two seminar groups. Each seminar meets for one hour each week, except for the reading week.

### **Availability**

For MSc Political Theory; MSc in Inequalities and Social Science; MSc Gender; MSc Gender, Development and Globalisation; MSc Gender, Media and Culture; MSc Gender, Policy and Inequalities; and MSc Human Rights. This course is available as an outside option to students on other programmes where regulations permit.

This course is capped at 2 groups.

### **Course content**

The course starts with the general question of why (or if) equality matters. It then introduces some of the major debates in the contemporary literature on equality. These debates include: the appropriate metric for making comparisons between persons; the difference between equality, priority, and sufficiency; and the relationship between equality and justice. Throughout the course, and particularly in the latter half, we consider concrete social problems and dilemmas faced by those who are committed to the ideal of equality. In addition to other topics, the course will consider the value of access to health and the implications for equality when there is social segregation according to class, race, and other groups.

### **Teaching**

Ten 1 hour lectures and ten 1 hour seminar sessions in the Michaelmas Term. Students are expected to do preparatory reading for each week's seminar, and also to participate in the

discussion and other activities.

### **Coursework**

Students have the option to submit a short formative essay (up to 1500 words), and they are strongly encouraged to do so. These formative essays are to be submitted as Word documents through the Moodle site, at the end of the reading week. If students submit their formative essays by this date, they will receive feedback in good time from the course instructor before the assessed essays are due.

Students must submit a 4500 word essay, which counts for 100% of the total marks for the course. Question prompts will be provided by the instructor.

### **Course outline:**

Week 1: Introduction

Week 2: Equality and priority

Week 3: Equality of what?

Week 4: The capabilities approach

Week 5: Relational equality

Week 6: Reading week (no class meetings, formative essays due)

Week 7: Poverty and having enough

Week 8: Status hierarchies and social domination

Week 9: Equality and group membership

Week 10: Social segregation and community

Week 11: Discrimination

### **Course readings**

#### **Week 1: Introduction**

This week motivates the course's study of equality by examining several arguments concerning contemporary social issues. These arguments evaluate everyday experiences of gender discrimination, group-based disparities in educational opportunities, and what is bad about poverty. By the end of the course, students will have the tools necessary to assess these normative and conceptual arguments.

#### **Essential reading:**

Brennan, S. (2009) Feminist Ethics and Everyday Inequalities. *Hypatia* 24, no. 1, pp. 141-159

Anderson, E. (2012) Race, culture, and educational opportunity. *Theory and Research in Education* 10, no. 2, pp. 105-129.

Wolff, J. (2019) Poverty. *Philosophy Compass* 10, pp. 283-10.

## Further Reading

Arneson, R. (2013) Egalitarianism. In *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (ed. Edward N. Zalta) (<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/egalitarianism/>)

Card, C. (1998) Evils and Inequalities. *Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues* 9, pp. 87-101

Brennan, S. (2016) The Moral Status of Micro-Inequalities. In *Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics*. Oxford University Press.

McTernan, E. (2018) Microaggressions, Equality, and Social Practices. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 26, pp. 261-281.

Myers, C. K. et. al. (2010) Ladies first? A Field Study of Discrimination in Coffee Shops. *Journal of Applied Economics* 42, no. 14, pp. 1751-69.

Lareau, A. (2011) *Unequal Childhoods: Class, Race, and Family Life*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Haslanger, S. (2014) Studying While Black: Trust, Opportunities, and Disrespect. *Du Bois Review*, 11(1), pp. 109-136.

Mijs, J. B. (2016) The Unfulfillable Promise of Meritocracy: Three Lessons and Their Implications for Justice in Education. *Social Justice Research* 29, pp. 4-34

Chandhoke, N. (2012) Why People Should Not Be Poor. *Economic & Political Weekly* xlvi, no. 14, pp. 41-50.

## **Week 2: Equality and priority**

This week considers principles for evaluating how goods are distributed. Is it a better state of affairs when goods are distributed equally between people? How can inequalities be justified to the persons disadvantaged by them?

### Essential reading:

Nagel, T. (1979) Equality. In *Mortal Questions*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 106-127 (ebook).

Parfit, D. (1997) Equality and Priority. *Ratio* 10, no. 3, pp. 202-221.

### Further Readings

O'Neill, M. (2008) What Should Egalitarians Believe? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 36, no. 2, pp. 119-56.

Brown, A. (2014) What Should Egalitarians Believe if They Really Are Egalitarian? a Reply to Martin O'Neill. *European Journal of Political Theory* 13, no. 4, pp. 453–69.

Temkin, L. (2003) Egalitarianism Defended. *Ethics*, 113, no. 4, pp. 764–782.

Norman, R. (1997) The Social Basis of Equality. *Ratio* 10, no. 3, pp. 238-252.

### **Week 3: Equality of what?**

This week begins our investigation into what it is, exactly, that ought to be equalized between persons. This week's readings consider welfare, or the satisfaction of preferences, as a potential answer to the "equality of what" question.

#### Essential readings

Dworkin, R. (1981) What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 10, no. 3, pp. 185-246

Scanlon, T. M. (1975) Preference and Urgency. *The Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. 72, No. 19, Seventy-Second Annual Meeting American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, pp. 655-669

#### Further readings

Dworkin, R. (1981) What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10, no. 4, pp. 283-345

Sen, A. (1980) Equality of What? *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*  
<http://www.tannerlectures.utah.edu/lectures/documents/sen80.pdf>

Dworkin, R. (2002) Sovereign Virtue Revisited. *Ethics* 113, no. 1, pp. 106–143.

Cohen, G.A. (1989) On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice. *Ethics* 99, pp. 906-44

Cohen, G.A. (2004) Expensive Taste Rides Again. In (ed) Justine Burley, *Dworkin and His Critics: With Replies by Dworkin*, Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Arneson, R. (2000) Welfare Should Be the Currency of Justice. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 30, No. 4, pp. 497-524.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2013). Offensive Preferences, Snobbish Tastes, and Egalitarian Justice. *Journal of Social Philosophy* 44, no. 4, pp. 439–458.

### **Week 4: The capabilities approach**

This week continues our discussion of the “equality of what” question. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen argue that all individuals should have the capability to take part in valuable “beings and doings.” We consider the use of the capability approach for claims about the equality of disabled and non-disabled people.

### Essential Readings:

Nussbaum, M. (2011) *Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach*. Chapter 2: The Central Capabilities. Harvard University Press.

Sen, A. (1999) excerpt from *Development as Freedom*, Chapter 4: Poverty as Capability Deprivation (pp. 87-110)

Cureton, A. (2018) Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled. In (Eds. Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) *Disability in Practice: Attitudes, Policies, and Relationships*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

### Further readings

Robeyns, I. (2016) The Capabilities Approach, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/capability-approach/>

Nussbaum, M. (1992) Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism. *Political Theory* 20, No. 2, pp. 202-246

Nussbaum, M. (2000) *Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach*, Cambridge University Press. pp. 11-15; 70-86 (e-book)

Nussbaum, M. (2003) Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice. *Feminist Economics* 9, no. 2&3, pp. 33-60

Robeyns, I. (2005). The Capability Approach: a Theoretical Survey. *Journal of Human Development*, 6 (1), 93–117.

Robeyns, I. (2006) The Capability Approach in Practice. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 14, no. 3, pp. 351–376.

Robeyns, I. (2003) Sen’s capability approach and gender inequality: selecting relevant capabilities, *Feminist Economics*, 9(2-3), pp. 61-92.

Wolff, J. and Avner de-Shalit, (2007) *Disadvantage*, Chapter 1: The Pluralism of Disadvantage (e-book)

Claassen, R. (2010). Making Capability Lists: Philosophy versus Democracy. *Political Studies*, 59(3), 491–508.

Jaggar, A. (2006). Reasoning About Well-Being: Nussbaum's Methods of Justifying the Capabilities. *Journal of Political Philosophy*, 1–22.

Okin, S. (2003). Poverty, Well-Being, and Gender: What Counts, Who's Heard? *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 280-316

Nussbaum, M. (2001). Symposium on Amartya Sen's Philosophy: 5 Adaptive Preferences and Women's Options. *Economics and Philosophy* 17, pp. 67-88.

Barnes, E. (2009) Disability and Adaptive Preference. *Philosophical Perspectives* 23, no. 1: 1–21.

Barnes, E. (2016) *The Minority Body: A Theory of Disability*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Barclay, L. (2012) Natural Deficiency or Social Oppression? The Capabilities Approach to Justice for People with Disabilities. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 9, no. 4, pp. 500-520.

Wolff, J. (2009) Disability Among Equals. In Kimberley Brownlee and Adam Cureton (Eds. ) *Disability and Disadvantage*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Begon, J. (2014) What Are Adaptive Preferences? Exclusion and Disability in the Capability Approach. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32, no. 3, pp. 241–57.

### **Week 5: Relational equality**

This week will focus on the contrast between relational equality and luck egalitarianism. Luck egalitarianism holds that it is wrong for people to be disadvantaged by circumstances for which they are not responsible (bad luck). Relational equality often understands relationships of equality, particularly between citizens in a democracy, to be requirements of justice.

#### Essential Readings

Anderson, E. (1999) What is the Point of Equality? *Ethics* 109, no. 2, pp. 287–337.

Scheffler, S. (2005) Choice, Circumstance, and the Value of Equality. *Politics, Philosophy, and Economics* 4, no. 1, pp. 5-28.

Voigt, K. and Wester, G. (2015) Relational Equality and Health. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31, no. 2, pp. 204-229.

#### Further Readings

Fourie, C. (2016) Sufficiency of Capabilities, Social Equality, and Two-Tiered Health Care Systems. In Carina Fourie and Annette Rid (Eds.) *What is Enough? Sufficiency, Justice, and Health*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Preda, A. and Voight, K. (2015) The Social Determinants of Health: Why Should We Care?

Arneson, R. (1989) Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare. *Philosophical Studies* 56, pp. 77–93.

Arneson, R. (2000) Luck Egalitarianism and Prioritarianism. *Ethics*, 110(2), pp.339–349.

Voigt, K. (2007) The Harshness Objection: Is Luck Egalitarianism Too Harsh on the Victims of Option Luck? *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 389-407

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (1999). Are Some Inequalities more Unequal than Others? Nature, Nurture and Equality. *Utilitas*, 16(2), pp. 193–219.

Scheffler, S. (2003) What is Egalitarianism? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 31, no. 1, pp. 5-39.

Miller, D. (1997) Equality and Justice. *Ratio (new series) December*, pp. 222-237.

Walzer, M. (1983) *Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality*, Basic Books, pp. 3-30 (Chapter 1, Complex Equality).

Anderson, E. (2008) How Should Egalitarians Cope with Market Risks? *Theoretical Inquiries in Law* 9, pp. 239-270.

Bankovsky, M. (2018) Excusing Economic Envy: On Injustice and Impotence. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 35, no. 2, pp. 257-279.

Morgan-Knapp, C. (2014) Economic Envy. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 31, no. 2, pp. 113-126.

Voigt, K. (2018) Relational Equality and the Expressive Dimension of State Action. *Social Theory & Practice* 44, no. 3, pp. 437-467

Voigt, K. (2020) Relational Egalitarianism. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*. DOI: 10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1387

### **Week 6: Reading week**

This week we will not have lecture or seminars. Please use the drop in office hours or schedule an appointment with the course instructor to discuss your ideas for the formative essays, which will be due at the end of the week.

### **Week 7: Poverty and having enough**

This week considers material deprivation and what it means to be poor. One position is that everyone should 'have enough' material resources (money) to be content, and it is not

important for resources to be equally distributed. Other views to be considered this week describe how material deprivation can affect self-respect, status, and agency.

### Essential readings

Wolff, J. (1998) Fairness, Respect, and the Egalitarian Ethos. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 27, no. 2, pp. 97–122.

Frankfurt, H. (2000) The Moral Irrelevance of Equality. *Public Affairs Quarterly* 14, pp. 87–103.

Ci, J. (2013) Agency and Other Stakes of Poverty. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 21, no. 2, pp. 125-150.

### Further readings

Frankfurt, H. (1987) Equality as a Moral Ideal. *Ethics* 98, no. 1, pp. 21-43

Crisp, R. (2003) Equality, Priority, and Compassion. *Ethics* 113, no. 4, pp. 745-763

Frankfurt, H. (1997) Equality and Respect. *Social Research* 64, pp. 3–15.

Casal, P. (2007) Why Sufficiency is Not Enough. *Ethics* 117, no. 2, pp. 296-326

Huseby, R. (2010) Sufficiency: Restated and Defended. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 18, no. 2, pp. 178–197.

Anderson, E. (2004) Welfare, Work Requirements, and Dependent-Care. *Journal of Applied Philosophy*, 21, pp. 243–256.

Wolff, J. (2015) Political Philosophy and the Real World of the Welfare State. *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 32, pp. 360-372

Wolff, J. (2010). Fairness, Respect and the Egalitarian Ethos Revisited. *The Journal of Ethics*, 14(3-4), 335–350.

White, S. (2004). What's Wrong with Workfare? *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 21, no. 3, pp. 271-284.

Fraser, N. (1989) Talking About Needs: Interpretive Contests as Political Conflicts in Welfare-State Societies. *Ethics* 99, no. 2, pp. 291–313.

Kabeer, N. (2000). Social Exclusion, Poverty and Discrimination: Towards an Analytical Framework. *Ids Bulletin*, 31(4), pp. 1–15.



Deveaux, M. (2018). Re-evaluating Sufficiency in Light of Evidence of Inequality's Harms. *Ethics and Social Welfare* 12, no. 2, pp. 97-116.

Schuppert, F. (2013). Distinguishing basic needs and fundamental interests. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, 16(1), 24–44.

Axelsen, D. and Nielson, L. (2015). Sufficiency as Freedom from Duress. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 23, 4, pp. 406-426.

Putnam, D. (2020). Poverty as a Social Relation. *Dimensions of Poverty: Global Poverty Measurement in Philosophical, Economic, and Social Perspective*. Valentin Beck, Henning Hahn, and Robert Lepenies, editors. Springer.

Wolff, J. (2020). Beyond Poverty. *Dimensions of Poverty: Global Poverty Measurement in Philosophical, Economic, and Social Perspective*. Valentin Beck, Henning Hahn, and Robert Lepenies, editors. Springer.

## **Week 8: Status hierarchies and social domination**

This week will describe objections to inequalities that are grounded in their social implications. One social implication concerns status and a society's conventional meanings of respect, while another concerns the potential for advantaged groups to dominate and oppress others.

### Essential Readings

Scanlon, T. (2003) The Diversity of Objections to Inequality. In *The Difficulty of Tolerance*, Cambridge University Press, pp. 202-218 (ebook)

Fourie, C. (2011). What is Social Equality? An Analysis of Status Equality as a Strongly Egalitarian Ideal. *Res Publica* 18, no. 2, pp. 107–126.

González-Ricoy, I. and Queralt, J. (2018). Political Liberties and Social Equality. *Law and Philosophy* 37, 6, pp. 613-638.

### Further readings

Scanlon, T.M. (2017) *Why does inequality matter?* Oxford University Press

Schuppert, F. (2015). Non-domination, non-alienation and social equality: towards a republican understanding of equality. *Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy*, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 440–455

Schemmel, C. (2011) Why Relational Egalitarians Should Care about Distributions. *Social Theory and Practice* 37, pp. 365–390.

Anderson, E. (2015). Equality and Freedom in the Workplace: Republican Insights. *Social Philosophy and Policy* 31, no. 2, pp. 48-69.

De Wispelaere, J. and Casassas, D. (2014) A Life of One's Own: Republican Freedom and Disability. *Disability and Society*, 29, no. 3, pp. 402-416.

Kolodny, N. (2014) Rule over None I: What Justifies Democracy? *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, 3, pp. 195-229.

Kolodny, N. (2014) Rule over None II: Social Equality and the Justification of Democracy *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 42, 4, pp. 287-336.

McClendon, G. (2018) *Envy in Politics*. Princeton University Press.

Robeyns, I. (2016) Having Too Much. In J. Knight and M. Schwartzberg (eds.) *NOMOS LVI: Wealth. Yearbook of the American Society for Political and Legal Philosophy*, New York University Press.

Miller, W. I. (1995) Upward Contempt. *Political Theory* 23, no. 3, pp. 476-99.

Young, I. (1990) *Justice and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton University Press, pp. 15-38

Brighthouse, H., & Swift, A. (2006). Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods. *Ethics*, 116(3), 471-497.

Schemmel, C. (2011) Distributive and Relational Equality. *Politics, Philosophy & Economics* 11, no. 2, pp. 123-148.

Wolff, J. (2013). Scanlon on Social and Material Inequality. *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 10, no. 4, pp. 406-425.

Lawler, S. (2005) Disgusted Subjects: The Making of Middle-Class Identities. *The Sociological Review* 53, no. 3, pp. 429-446.

Adams, M. and Rainsborough, J. (2011) The self-control ethos and the 'chav': unpacking cultural representations of the white working class, *Culture and Psychology* 17, no. 1, pp. 81-97.

Sayer, A. (2005). Responses to class: egalitarianism, respect(ability), class pride, and moral boundary-drawing. In *The Moral Significance of Class*. Cambridge University Press.

Sayer, A. (2005). Moral and immoral sentiments and class. In *The Moral Significance of Class*. Cambridge University Press.

Garrau, M., & Laborde, C. (2015). Relational equality, non-domination, and vulnerability. In C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, & I. Wallimann-Helmer (Eds.), *Social equality: On what it means to be equals* (pp. 45–64). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Fourie, C. (2015) To praise and to scorn. In C. Fourie, F. Schuppert, & I. Wallimann-Helmer (Eds.), *Social equality: On what it means to be equals* (pp. 45–64). Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

## **Week 9: Equality and group membership**

This week considers social groups and what differing outcomes between groups can tell us about underlying inequalities. In this week, we also consider the limits on efforts to address inequalities through group-based remedies.

### Essential readings

Phillips, A. (2004) Defending Equality of Outcome. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 12, no. 1, pp. 1-19

Young, I. (2001) Equality of Whom? Social Groups of Judgments of Injustice. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9, no. 1, pp. 1–18

Voigt, K. (2017) Distributive equality, relational equality, and preferences about higher education. *Theory and Research in Education*. 15, no. 2, pp. 109-128.

### Further readings

Threadcraft, S. (2018). Introduction. In *Intimate Justice*, Oxford University Press (e-book), pp. 1–33.

Crenshaw, K. (1990) A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Law and Politics. In *The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique*, (ed) David Kairys (New York: Pantheon Books).

Armstrong, C. (2006). Debating Opportunities, Outcomes and Democracy: Young and Phillips on Equality. *Political Studies*, 1–21.

Phillips, A. (2006) “Really” Equal: Opportunities and Autonomy. *Journal of Political Philosophy* 14, no. 1, pp. 18-32

Young, I.M. (1989) Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal of Universal Citizenship. *Ethics* 99, pp. 250–274.

Haslanger, S. (2000) Race and Gender: (What) Are They? (What) Do We Want Them to Be? *Nous* 31, no. 1, pp. 31-55.

Sher, G. (1977) Groups and Justice. *Ethics* 87, no. 2, pp. 174–181.

Fiss, O. (1976) Groups and the Equal Protection Clause. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 5, pp. 107-177.

## **Week 10: Social segregation and community**

This week focuses on social segregation, particularly economic segregation and residential segregation. In this week, we also consider efforts to make joint use of luck egalitarianism and relational egalitarianism.

### Essential Readings

Halliday, D. (2019) Inequality and Economic Segregation. In *Inheritance of Wealth: Justice, Equality, and the Right to Bequeath*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kohn, M. (2013). What is Wrong with Gentrification? *Urban Research & Practice*, 6 no. 3, pp. 297-310.

Young, I.M. (1999). Residential Segregation and Differentiated Citizenship. *Citizenship Studies*, 3, no. 2, pp. 237-252.

### Further Readings

Kohn, M. (2016) *The Death and Life of the Urban Commonwealth*, Chapter 6 on Transit Justice. Oxford University Press.

Wolff, J. (2017). Forms of Differential Social Inclusion. *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 34(01), 1-22.

Putnam, D. (2020) Gentrification and Domination. *The Journal of Political Philosophy*, DOI: 10.1111/jopp.12220

Anderson, E. (2010) *The Imperative of Integration*. Princeton University Press.

Navin, M. (2011). Luck and Oppression. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 14(5), 533-547.

Brownlee, K. (2013) A Human Right Against Social Deprivation. *The Philosophical Quarterly* 63, no. 251, pp. 199-222.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2015). Luck egalitarians versus relational egalitarians: on the prospects of a pluralist account of egalitarian justice. *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 45(2), pp. 220-241.

Tan, K. (2008) A Defense of Luck Egalitarianism. *The Journal of Philosophy* 105, pp. 665-690.

Schemmel, C. (2013). Luck egalitarianism as Democratic Reciprocity? A Response to Tan. *Journal of Philosophy*, 1–14.

Elford, G. (2015). Social Class, Merit and Equality of Opportunity in Education. *Res Publica*, 22(3), 267–284.

Swift, A. (2003) *How Not to be a Hypocrite: School Choice for the Morally Perplexed Parent*. London: Routledge Press.

Shelby, T. (2007) Justice, Deviance, and the Dark Ghetto. *Philosophy and Public Affairs*. 35, no 2, pp. 126-160.

Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2018). *Relational egalitarianism: Living as equals*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Friedman S., Laurison, D., and Miles, A. (2015) Breaking the 'Class' Ceiling? Social Mobility into Britain's Elite Occupations. *The Sociological Review* 63, no. 2, pp. 259-289.

## **Week 11: Discrimination**

This week focuses on discrimination and attempts to specify whether and how discrimination violates principles of equality. We will consider whether discrimination must entail comparatively worse treatment of one social group over another, and if certain actions are discriminatory because of their social meanings (even when the discriminator is unaware of these meanings or does not intend them).

### Essential Readings

Moreau, S. (2013). In Defense of a Liberty-Based Account of Discrimination. In ed. Deborah Hellman and Sophia Moreau, *Philosophical Foundations of Discrimination Law*. Oxford University Press.

Hellman, D. (2011) *When is Discrimination Wrong?* Harvard University Press, Chapter 2: Demeaning and Wrongful Discrimination, pp. 34-58.

### Further Readings

Altman, A. (2011) Discrimination. In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*.

Alexander, L. (1992) What makes Wrongful Discrimination Wrong? *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 141(1), pp. 149–219.

Davis, H. F. (2014) Sex-Classification Policies as Transgender Discrimination: An Intersectional Critique. *Perspectives on Politics*. 12, no. 4, pp. 45-60.

- Goff, S. (2016) How to Trade Fairly in an Unjust Society: The Problem of Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market. *Social Theory and Practice*. 42, no. 3, pp. 555-580.
- Moreau, S. (2004) The Wrongs of Unequal Treatment, *University of Toronto Law Journal* 54 (3) pp. 291-326.
- Eidelson, B. (2015) *Discrimination and Disrespect*, Oxford University Press (Chapter 4, Respect for Equality, pp. 95-124).
- Arneson, R. (2006) What is Wrongful Discrimination? 43 *San Diego L. Rev.* 775-808
- Lippert-Ramsussen, K. (2014) *Born Free and Equal?* Oxford University Press.
- Lippert-Rasmussen, K. (2006). The Badness of Discrimination. *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 9: 167-85.
- Holmes, E. (2005) Anti-discrimination rights without equality. *The Modern Law Review*, Vol. 68, No. 2, pp. 175-194
- Segall, S. (2012). What's So Bad About Discrimination? *Utilitas* 24, no. 1, pp. 82–100.
- Levin, M. (1981) Is Racial Discrimination Special? *Journal of Value Inquiry* 15, pp. 225-232.
- Brooks, D. (1983) Why Discrimination is Especially Wrong, *Journal of Value Inquiry* 17, pp. 305-312.
- Wertheimer, A. (1983) Jobs, Qualifications, and Preferences, *Ethics* 94(1), pp. 99–112.
- Slavny, A. and Parr, T. (2015). Harmless Discrimination. *Legal Theory* 21, pp. 100–114.
- Thomsen, F. K. (2013) But Some Groups Are More Equal Than Others. *Social Theory and Practice* 39, no. 1, pp. 120–46.
- Moreau, S. (2020) *Faces of Inequality: a Theory of Wrongful Discrimination*. Oxford University Press.