Month: October 2015

“How to Trade Fairly in an Unjust Society: The Problem of Gender Discrimination in the Labor Market” Social Theory and Practice Volume 42, Issue 3 (July 2016), pp. 555-580

Social scientists disagree about the causes of the “wage gap” between male and female workers and, in particular, how much of the gap is due to differences in workers’ productivity. Understanding the underlying causes is important, insofar as this helps identify who is responsible for closing the gap. This information is particularly relevant for specifying the responsibilities of employers, who have dual social roles as economic actors and as citizens. In this paper, I begin with the assumption that many employers underestimate the qualifications of female job applicants in hiring and promotion decisions. The paper then describes a form of discrimination that occurs when many economic actors make this kind of correlated error in their judgments. The paper argues that an individual employer has responsibilities not to make these errors in judgment about female workers, due to the harmful impact on women’s opportunities. An employer also has duties not to exploit female employees, which occurs when he pays them lower wages than he would if other employers did not discriminate against them.

“Fair Trade: Global Problems and Individual Responsibilities,” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, Volume 21, Issue 4 (2018), pp. 521-543: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13698230.2016.1252993

Winner of the CRISPP Essay Prize for Best Article in Volume 21 (2018) Awarded by the Editors of the Journal

The topic of global trade has become central to debates on global justice and on duties to the global poor, two important concerns of contemporary political theory. However, the leading approaches fail to directly address the participants in trade and provide them with normative guidance for making choices in non-ideal circumstances. This paper contributes an account of individuals’ responsibilities for global problems in general, an account of individuals’ responsibilities as market actors, and an explanation of how these responsibilities co-exist. The argument is developed through an extended case study of a consumer’s choice between conventional and fair trade coffee. My argument is that the coffee consumer’s choice requires consideration of two distinct responsibilities. First, she has responsibilities to help meet foreigners’ claims for assistance. Second, she has moral responsibilities to ensure that trades, such as between herself and a coffee farmer, are fair rather than exploitative.

Effective altruists (EAs) have made several valuable contributions to ethical debates about international assistance. Most notably, EAs make use of evidence to produce practical guidelines for how a donor should select charities for her donations. This paper accepts the EAs’ method of ethical reasoning about international assistance from the perspective of an individual donor. However, my argument challenges the EAs’ recommendation that donors should select global charities with a narrow focus on specific projects for which there is strong evidence of effectiveness. I argue that EAs misunderstand how the donor acts to make a difference through international assistance. The donor makes a difference indirectly, by enabling and encouraging charities to act and make choices that promote good outcomes for beneficiaries. In addition, EAs overlook social scientific evidence that suggests it is often more effective for donors to grant charities discretion to use their judgment over how they choose and implement their programs. Finally, I argue that EAs should advise individuals to take action to address deficiencies in funding and public information about international assistance. EAs have good reasons to recommend action to address these problems with the institutions of international assistance, because they undermine the donor’s potential to make a difference.

Many liberal democratic governments are sanctioning Russia in response to its 2022 invasion of Ukraine, through restrictions on goods that directly and indirectly support Russia’s military activities and on financial services. I find it striking that public support for the sanctions remains high, even as costs mount for the sanctioning states and some commentators question the impact on Russia. This paper defends a potential value in a liberal democracy’s sanctions against countries that violate ethical standards in their institutions and policies. I argue for the potential value of sanctions as a meaningful expression. A liberal democracy can make a meaningful expression about its principles, by no longer involving itself in trade with a particular state. But I have doubts about whether the liberal democracies are in a good position to act meaningfully in imposing sanctions. Many liberal democracies have taken action to restrict trade in response to their partners’ trade and economic practices, which they judge to be ‘unfair.’ I will argue that some of these actions are inconsistent with their valuation of trade and trading partnerships. If citizens of a liberal democracy do not value trade in general, what do their sanctions mean? I will analyze the need for consistency across trade and other policy areas, in order for liberal democracies to act meaningfully when they sanction particular states.